The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in Jeopardy? Internal Divisions and the Impact of World Politics

The frustration of non-nuclear weapon states about the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament has reached boiling point: a vast majority of them have supported a resolution in the UN General Assembly that establishes a negotiation forum for concluding a prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2017. Rising tension among the nuclear powers and populist movements feeding nationalist emotions make it unlikely that the situation will change for the better in the near future. It is thus possible that the NPT might be eroded or, in the worst case scenario, simply collapse because of diminishing support.     

THE IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: ONE YEAR ON

This article, written by the former British Ambassador to Iran, starts with an overview from an insider's perspective of the 15 years of diplomacy leading up to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran's Nuclear capabilities. It discusses the merits of the plan and its prospects for the future. It examines the development of international economic engagement, and in particular argues that the western powers need to do far more to deliver an economic quid pro quo for Iran's nuclear concessions: if the situation is not appreciably better soon, it will be impossible for the US and its partners to argue credibly that they are not in breach of the JCPOA. The article concludes with a discussion of Iran's economic and political prospects in the light of the nuclear deal.     

当前东北亚安全困局及其“病灶”探析

2016年以来,因朝鲜第四次核试验及美韩宣布在韩国部署"萨德"反导系统,东北亚固有的安全困境更加突出,并引起相关国家及国际社会的进一步密切关注。就当前而论,东北亚安全困境具体表现为朝鲜在进行第四次核试验后,其核武器开发继续"跃马扬鞭";美韩以朝核威胁为由加强驻韩美军实力,包括不顾中俄强烈反对,决意在韩部署"萨德"反导系统;日本在进一步倚美的同时,趁势拉拢韩国,强化对华敌视政策,致使中日关系频现紧张;美国一方面以应对朝核威胁为由而加强其在东北亚的军事力量和"前沿部署",另一方面又极力拉紧美日韩同盟,其在东北亚遏制中俄的态势更趋明朗。东北亚安全局势持续紧张的深层次原因:一是由于东北亚国家间存在复杂的领土领海及历史纠葛,二是朝鲜半岛南北长期对立,三是日本在历史认知及其与东北亚邻国领土领海分歧等问题上长期采取顽固立场,四是美国搞"亚太再平衡",利用东北亚国家间的固有矛盾从中渔利,企图通过对华进行"局部遏制"而长期维持其在东北亚的同盟体系及霸权。未来东北亚安全困境是继续加深、激化还是逐步淡化,取决于上述深层次原因的演变方向。     

The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

This article analyses the US–EU transatlantic dialogue on the Iranian nuclear dossier with a particular view to the implications for EU foreign policy on Iran. Doing so, it uses neo-Gramscian scholarship to put the EU’s “over-compliance” with Iran sanctions into perspective. Constrained by the imperatives of hegemonic coercion in the form of US financial Iran sanctions against third country entities and with the hegemonic consent of a Western US-led “historic bloc”, Europe was relegated to a subaltern below its mediatory potential. It will be shown how this finding complicates the EU’s ambition to renew relations with Iran. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with experts and delegation members from the P5+1, this article thus analyses “the normative element” in the transatlantic security dialogue on Iran at a time where the latter is undergoing a sea change in the wake of the implementation of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” of July 2015.     

再论核禁忌

“核禁忌”作为一种道德规范是具有感召力的。然而,“核禁忌”理论本身存在诸多矛盾和谬误之处。不使用核武器并没有成为一种普遍的禁止性规范,“核禁忌”也无法削弱核威慑的意义。从历史经验看,尽管自广岛、长崎之后核武器再也没有被使用过,但许多决策者都有过使用核武器的想法。只是根据理性分析、权衡利弊之后放弃了这一选择。而从政治心理学的层面分析,“核禁忌”理论显然夸大了单一规范在决策过程中的影响力。尤其在不同的利益相互冲突的场景下,国家安全往往具有压倒性的地位。事实上,冷战后的全球核态势发展并没有受到这种禁忌的束缚,却时而出现倾向于使用核武器的势头。近年来,美国正对其核武库进行现代化升级并积极研发新型核武器。以美俄为代表的核大国也通过调整自身的核战略为可能实施的核打击大开方便之门。似是而非的“核禁忌”实际上反而增强了核威慑的必要性。虽然“核禁忌”在推动一系列核军控条约以及扩大无核武器区的建设过程中起到了一定的作用,但单纯依靠观念的力量并不能引领人类走向无核世界。只要引发地区冲突和安全困境的政治根源得不到化解,核武器作为战争的工具之一就有可能被使用。而为了确保国家安全和战略稳定,核威慑的必要性在短期内仍然无可替代。     

Protecting people's livelihoods,restarting nuclear reactors: ‘risk recalibration’ in Prime Minister Noda's 8 June 2012 national address

Given popular concerns about nuclear accidents in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, the Japanese state shut down the last of its fifty-four reactors for inspections on 5 May 2012, the first time the country had been without nuclear energy since May 1970. However, on 8 June 2012, in a nationwide address, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko justified a resumption of nuclear power generation at the Oi nuclear plant in Oimachi, Fukui Prefecture. This article examines Noda's speech as an example of ‘risk recalibration’. The first section outlines the underlying theoretical assumptions, while the second section provides the context behind the speech. This involved the input of political, economic and social actors as they vied for policy influence. The third section then analyses the risk rationality used in the speech itself. The argument is that while the speech is an important example of risk rationality operating through discourse as a medium of power, the overall ‘recalibration’ runs contrary to what recent studies have shown in other areas. In short, it is held that the speech follows a more traditional paternalistic logic of centralized risk management rather than a neoliberal logic of ‘individual responsibility’.     

Policy Change,Policy Feedback,and Interest Mobilization: The Politics of Nuclear Waste Management

Many of the leading theories of the policy process are aimed at providing insights into the factors that make policy change more (or less) likely. In general, policy change is seen as a result of shifting dynamics within policy subsystems. However, building on theories of policy feedback and interest mobilization, this article examines whether policy change, apart from being an effect of subsystem dynamics, can be a cause of shifting dynamics as latent actors are motivated to participate in the subsystem as a result of policy change. Two hypotheses regarding post‐policy change mobilization are developed and tested using data on participation in congressional hearings concerning the management of nuclear waste. The findings suggest that policy change can activate latent policy actors, specifically those actors that view themselves as “losing” as a result of the policy change. These results point to the need for scholars to examine the potential impacts of post‐policy change dynamics on policy development.     

A battle of principles: South Africa's relations with Iran

This paper provides a detailed case study and theoretical explanation for one of the least appreciated bilateral relationships of democratic South Africa. It analyses South Africa's post-apartheid relations with Iran as a case study to illustrate and discuss the contradictory principles that appear to guide South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa's tempered reaction to Iran's nuclear programme is in contradiction with its non-proliferation stance, but can be understood by looking into the ideology of the ruling African National Congress.     

Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

In order to counter the threat of a coup, states often undertake a number of strategies to “coup-proof” their militaries, such as creating institutional redundancy, severely limiting interbranch communications, and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit. As a result of such policies, however, the fighting effectiveness of these armed forces is degraded, and the marginal return on military investment is greatly reduced. We argue that leaders who have coup-proofed their militaries undertake several substitution policies in order to offset their military weakness when faced with external threats. These policies include pursuing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and forging alliances. We find support for these theoretical predictions in quantitative tests on data with global coverage between 1970 and 2001.     

(Nuclear) Change of Plans: What Explains Nuclear Reversals?

What explains a state’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program? While instances of nuclear reversal figure prominently in international politics, evidence in the literature has been largely piecemeal. We offer a novel conceptualization of the proliferation process as nonlinear, potentially including instances of reversal, as well as pursuit of a nuclear program and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Employing this theoretical framework, we consider states’ cost-benefit calculations in each phase of the proliferation process, and we test our theory using a multistate model. Two counterintuitive findings emerge from this framework. First, nuclear latency increases the likelihood of pursuit and acquisition but also increases the likelihood of reversal by reducing the costs of restarting a program in the future. Second, the nonproliferation regime discourages states without a nuclear program from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons while at the same time making states with nuclear programs less likely to reverse course.